学位级别：硕  士
提交日期：2002年5月10日
答辩日期：2002年5月27日
中文题名：权利：法哲学的本体论承诺——关于权利的语言问题研究
英文题名：Rights: the Noumenal Promises of Legal Philosophy
——the Investigation of Language Issues about Rights
中文主题标识：权利的语言问题
英文主题标识：Language Issues about Rights
作者姓名：王  峰
所在单位：吉林大学法学院
专    业：法学理论
指导教师：姚建宗教授
所在单位：吉林大学法学院
论文分类号：DF0
单位代码：10183
总页数：52页

论 文 摘 要

“法即权利，权利即法”，当人们如此界定权利与法的时候，在法哲学上这般界说并不是没有歧义的。究竟如何理解和解释互为定义项的权利与法呢？我们选择了法哲学的语言立场，由此来尝试性地追问与反思权利问题。所谓法哲学语言立场，以语言之于思想和世界的在先性和根本性为契入点，具体把权利问题区分成权利的经验事实问题和权利的语言承诺问题。始终贯穿于全文的这一立场，在于力图给出权利问题符合语言或者说法律语言本身的答案。
文章第一部分，在检讨有关权利分界问题的基础之上，提出权利问题在法哲学上的应有蕴含是来到语言，从而能够揭示权利的语言问题。具体就权利问题的分界而言，人们往往是在给予性的解释权利概念时，来规范和结构有关权利思想。显然，这是与我们的旨趣相悖的典型的知识论立场。它把权利问题归结成法之上的思维方法和逻辑目的，以“主体—人”为终极根据、以“划界清晰”为最终标准，进而获得不断解释的可能。权利成为“知”的外在对象，并在整个法律思维过程当中仅仅具有方法论意义。实际上，从思想的有效性上来看，法律生活当中的权利问题最重要之处在于它是我们日复一日所能体验着的语言当中的存在。来到语言思考权利问题，虽不是一条新奇的路径，但是往往为人所忽视。甚至可以说，作为法哲学本体论范畴的权利，由于本体论自身就是一个语言问题，而关于权利的语言问题却鲜有辨识。在这里，我们所谓权利的语言问题肇始于蒯因的本体论承诺思想，但并没有局限于此，它既包括现实生活经验，也关涉语言形式本身。根据语言问题本身所存在的两种互为经纬的方向，我们具体将权利问题置于其间来展现权利在法哲学语言承诺上的蕴含，即作为逻辑形式的权利和作为存在根据的权利。
文章第二部分，从语言与逻辑的角度来看待权利问题，在法哲学本体论上权利就被承诺为逻辑形式。我们遵循英美分析语言哲学的理路来探讨所谓权利的语言问题，就是将理性纳入到生活当中的语言视界里，借助人的实践活动，来理解和解释“法即权利，权利即法”这一命题，进而找回“权利之意义”的标准和发现权利逻辑的真理性之所在。从语言和逻辑之间关系的基本原理出发，结合维特根斯坦的启示，我们以命题或者说语句本身来追问这个由事态而非事物构成的世界的。在此，语言与逻辑的关系不能像传统逻辑观那样仅仅把逻辑看作与语言和思维相关联的致知工具，即在法哲学语言立场上是不能以抽象概念来构筑符合某种逻辑的权利知识体系。通过对权利命题“有无意义”的逻辑分析，我们发现无论是做为专名还是做为谓词形式出现的权利语句表达式都可以转化成指向个体的内容。同时，作为一个被指称的权利，不管其在法律事实上被承认与否，在语言逻辑上它早已属于个体；特定法律或适用特定法律所达致的法律后果是另一层面的实存。权利逻辑在语言本体上的两重分化预示了权利命题的“意义”是与人们的法律实践紧密联系在一起的。换言之，作为逻辑形式的权利，其内涵是在“法律行动”或者说“法律实践”中展现的。从语言、逻辑和实践的关系来看，权利意蕴的整体性就在于揭示权利的逻辑异质性。所谓权利的逻辑异质性就是指无论是在语言逻辑还是在法律实践当中，作为整体的权利都不能被逻辑同一化。法之上的普遍权利之所以能够规定得了作为个体的人，就在于整合由不同的理论所把握到的权利，在有关权利的生活经验和语言承诺之间寻求平衡改善权利的实际状况，培养一种基于逻辑异质性的生存智慧或曰实践智慧。
文章第三部分，从语言与存在的角度来看待权利问题，在法哲学本体论上权利就被承诺为存在根据。按照德国哲学解释学的语言立场，来分析权利问题就是要寻找人自己在法上的安身立命之本与回归家园之路。生活世界在人的意识之外（不依赖人的意识而存在），但在人的语言之中（人只能在语言中表述存在），从语言的存在性和存在的语言性这一基本原理出发，我们试图寻找到法与权利更为基础的方法论和本体论。首先，我们所解蔽权利存在是在区分了意义世界和实在世界的关系之下进行的。所谓意义世界，强调的是作为历史文化的世界存在对人的占有。由此出发，我们发现权利问题在法哲学上的一般境域是语言性的。世界经验的语言性决定了，法或者权利不可能尽在掌握之中，不能偏执于某一语言承诺本身。其次，回到法律语言本身就不能是简单地将法还原为人的权利存在，进行所谓“人的存在”的法学本质的追求。再次，权利的语言存在性实际上追求的是对“法与权利”问题本身答案的敞开性，进而体现了对人的存在样式和生活方式的实践智慧的尊重。语言当中的权利之所以能够作为存在根据，就在于避免了追求一种确切的、终极的本体承诺。这一法哲学立场的转变，在稍为经验的实践层面上，尤其是在当代中国法学“权利本位”范式上得以验证。
试图通过语言来接近权利问题，也许这仅仅是一种努力的开始。

Abstract

“ Law is the right, and the right is the law ”, someone has defined the concept of “right” and “law”. But in the aspect of legal philosophy, such will be controversial. Then how to understand and explain the “right” and “law”, which can defines each other? We choose the linguistic standpoint of legal philosophy to try to analyze and explain the concept of “right”. Such standpoint, with the priority and effect of foundation of language to thought and visible world as springboard, is from which we can divide the theory of “right” into theory of right as experiences and the theory of right as linguistic promises. Such choice of standpoint will make sense in analyzing legal language and the accordance of the theory of right with language.
In the first part, through analyzing the theory of dividing line of right, the author points out that the decent content of right theory in legal philosophy is to come-in language, so as to open out linguistic theory of right. As for the dividing line of right, we will always define and frame the thought of right when we explain the concept of right by given hypothesis. But obviously this will be the idea of the theory of knowledge, which is against our aims. This idea, by summing theory of right up to the way of thought and the aim which prior to the law, with the formula of “subject---human being” as the ultimate basis, with “a clear borderline” as the final criterion, gets its way of explanation. “Right”, as the outer object of “reading”, has the only sense of methodology in the whole process of legal thinking. In fact, from the aspect of the affectivity, the most important point of the right in legal practice is that it exists in our language that we use day by day. Thought of right and related ideas through come-in language is, not a newly developed way as it is, easy to be neglected. The right in the category of ontology of legal philosophy, since the ontology itself is language related, has no differentiation about its language related issues. The language related issues of right, which we talks about takes it source from the theory of promise in Quine’s ontology, but not all of it. It is related with not only living experiences in reality, but also language form itself. According to the two direction which exist in the issue of language itself, we put the issue of right between the two direction to express the content of right in the language promise in legal philosophy, which are the theory of right as form of logic and right as the reason of existence.
In the second part, the issue of right is analyzed in the angle of language and logic. In the ontology of legal philosophy, the right is accepted as the form of logic. The analysis on the language issues of right by the way of philological philosophy in the Great Britain and the United States is to understand and explain the proposition of “law is the right, the right is the law ”. This will need nous in the aspect of language in daily life, and also need the practice of human being. The further aim is to find the standard of “sense of the right ” and the truth of the logic of the right. From the springboard of the basic theory of the relation between language and logic, with the inspiration of Wittgenstein, we can use proposition or sentence to explain the world constituted by matters but not objects. The relation between language and logic cannot be looked on, in traditional theory of logic, as the means related with language and thought. In the standpoint of language in legal philosophy, abstract conception cannot be used to constitute logic system of knowledge. Through the logic analysis of the sense of the proposition of right, we find that the language expression, no matter in the form of special item or predicate, can be transitioned into the content aiming at individuals. Simultaneously, as a denoted right, no matter it is accepted or not legally or in fact, it has already belonged to individual in language logic. Typical law or application of typical law will lead to the legal sequent on another layer of sense. The diversification on the body of language of the logic of the right will manifesto the close relation of the “sense” of the proposition of the right with legal practices of human beings. From the relation of language, logic and practice, the entity of the content of right lies in explaining the logical heterogeneity of the right. The heterogeneity of the right is that no matter in language logic and legal practice, the right, as the entity, will not be consolidated logically. The general rights in the law can regulate the individuals, that’s because of the unity of different rights in different theory. The balance between the living experiences and language promise related with the right will benefit the actual situation of right, and the intelligence of living, or to say practical intelligence, based on the disparity of logic will be cultivated.
In the third part of this article, since the right is accepted as the reason of existence in ontology of legal philosophy, the right can also be analyzed from the angle of language and existence. In the standpoint of hermeneutic in Germanic philosophy, analysis of right is to look for the home for the people. The living world is out of one’s sense, but inside the language of people. From the basic theory of the existence of language and the language in existence, we try to find the basic methodology and ontology for the law and the right. At first, the explanation of the existence of right is exercised under the differentiation of the world in the sense and the world in existence. The concept of  “world in the sense” denotes to the possession on peoples by the world as historical cultural. From this point, we can find that all these issues related with the right are language attributed in common condition of legal philosophy. The language attribute in experience of the world has decided that the law or the right cannot be overall concluded. Any crankiness on the body of language promise will be improper. Secondly, regression to the body of legal language is not to simply revert the law to the existence of right, which is argument for the essence of the existence of man in law. Thirdly, the existence of language of the right actually argues for the open attribute of the key to the question of “the law and the right”. Such will show the respect to the intelligence of the mood of existence of man and their living. The right in language can be the reason of existence is because an acute and ultimate promise in ontology is avoided. Such transition in legal philosophy can be seen in the mode of “right oriented” in Chinese jurisprudence.
The attempt to analyze the right by the way of language may just begin the effort.